Agencification of National Museums in Japan by Yamamoto, Kiyoshi
Agencification of National Museums in Japan
Kiyoshi Yamamoto
1. Introduction
Separation of policy and execution functions is an integral part of the
new public management (NPM) which has been spreading around the
world (DECD, 1995). The hiving-off of government functions is called
agencification. The process for changing organisational structure and
improving performance involves allowing greater autonomy in resource
management in order to achieve the agreed targets. The Independent
Administrative Corporations (lACs) established by the Japanese
government will be legally independent of the central government and
responsible for the execution functions beginning in 2001.
The spread of NPM has been investigated by many scholars (Hood,
1995). Agencification is not exceptional (Greer, 1994; Horton and Jones,
1996). In this connection, scholars have focused on the factors influencing
innovation. For instance, government accounting researchers (Liider,
1994; Godfrey et aI., 1999) have analysed the trend to accrual accounting
as a subsystem of NPM. In other words, the focus is on either the
innovation of government as a whole or on the specific issues of NPM or
This paper was prepared for the ClMA Conference, New Public Sector Seminar on the
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agencification. However, when public sector reforms are analysed
collectively, it ignores the important issue that organisational structure
and management control system should and actually do differ among
services (Ouchi, 1979, 1980). In addition, the "subsystems" such as
financial, personnel and performance systems within NPM are
interrelated and may be complementary to one another (Pollitt, 1993).
In this regard, we will entirely examine agencification of the national
museums in Japan. Concentration of cultural services has another
advantage; it makes clear how the original model in the UK could be
accepted and incorporated into the revised system in Japan. Most
diffusions of innovation in the public sector are however harmonised with
the national culture or institutions in the adopted systems because of
different political and administrative practices. In practice, since the
museums in the UK's public sector operate in non-departmental public
bodies, not executive agencies, Japanese government has to develop a new
organisational management structure for its museum under
agencification.
This article investigates how agencification for the national museums
has progressed in terms of the development of financial, performance and
personnel systems. The second section firstly describes the characteristics
of museum activities and develops an innovative stage model in which an
organisation interacts with the external actors in each of the processes of
initiation, design and implementation. Then the initiation process for
agencification and outlines of lACs are discussed and compared to the
UK. The third section analyses responses of museum managers to
agencification. The fourth section discusses the management issues
presented by the new organisational structure. Finally, the fifth section is
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dedicated to some conclusions and future works.
2. Process ofAgencification
Characteristics ofMuseum Activities
Before analysing agencification, it is appropriate to classify public
services. While NPM presumes that organisational performance is able to
measure in quantitative terms, it is nevertheless difficult to measure
performance of public services. Sometimes they are provided in
combination of several activities such as education and research in
universities. Public services are therefore divided into four types in terms
of interdependency between organisational activities and objectivity of
performance measurement (see Figure 1). In other words, we may
understand that the objectivity of performance measurement is a
surrogate indicator of the service characteristics and the interdependency
reflects the organisational structure because the interrelation between
activities is changed by organisational design.
Museum activities are generally composed of collection, exhibition,
research and education. The functions of the national museums in Japan
are also similarly described in the Organisational Ordinance for Ministry
of Education as follows:
"The National Museum shall collect and preserve cultural assets,
exhibit them, in addition research and implement education programmes"
Figure 1. Classification of Public Services
Objectivity in Performance Measurement
High Low
Interdependency I High I II
between Activities I Low ill IV
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(Article 110).
Thus museum activities are interrelated each other, and there is
some difficulty in measuring performance collectively. Accordingly,
services provided by museum activities are basically classified as II in
Figure 1.
Model
Agencification, as previously indicated, is an organisational
transformation in the public sector. Therefore the transition into lACs
may be considered a diffusion process. Partly modifying the innovation
model by Roberts and King (1996) and the diffusion model by Rogers
(1995), we can divide the transforming process into initiation, design and
implementation stages. First, in the initiation stage, an organisation
reform is proposed with reference theoretical or practical model. Second,
the adoption of the model is determined by decision makers. Third, in the
design organisation structure and management are formed. Finally the
organisation transformation is put into practice. The transition is
regarded as an interactive process (see Figure 2). In contrast to the
reviewed models, our model not only considers the characteristics of
services which the organisation provides, but also presumes that a
different set of primary actors interact in each stage (I). It is assumed that
there are interactions between politicians and ministers in charge of the
organisation in the initiation stage, senior officials and chief executive of
the organisation in the design stage, and oversight bodies and chief
executives in the implementation stage respectively (see Figure 3). Here it
is relevant to note that organisational reform in the public sector is
unable to be initiated by the organisation itself, in contrast to private
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Figure 3. Primary Actors
External Actors Internal Actors
Initiation
Designing
Implementation
Politicians Minister in charge
Bureaucrats Chief executive
Oversight Bodies Chiefexecutive, managers
companies which can initiate their own reforms. Public sector reforms in
democracy involve decision making or approval by external actors such as
(1) This model differs from the innovation model by Roberts and King (1996) in four
respects. First, external actors involve opponents or neutral persons other than
entrepreneurs who represent a driving force for innovation. Second, our model
considers the organisational change process an interaction between internal actors of
the organisation and external actors. In contrast, they define the change process as
two interrelated processes of innovation and entrepreneurship, and also regard the
entrepreneurial process as a pushing process of introducing an innovative idea from
outside the organisation. Third, we investigate the transformation process of an
individual organisation in the public sector as the unit of analysis separate from
legislative or oversight bodies, though they do not definitely divide the government
into organisations. Finally, the most important difference is the consideration of
causal influencing factors. Although an interested group might have a significant
influence in the initiation and design stages, in the case of agencification of the
national museums the influence of opposition power was weak. In addition, the public
did not have a strong interest in arts and museums. Consequently primary opponents
were just internal actors, i. e. the museums themselves, though some organisations
such as the Japanese Association for Arts History made a critical comment on
agencification.
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politicians.
In the public sector, especially in a parliamentary system, while
fundamental decision making on organisational reform is initiated in the
political arena (parliament), rules for operating the reformed organisation
are basically designed in a technocratic manner between related senior
bureaucrats. In the implementation stage, though street level
bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980) to some extent have discretionary power over
their operations, the organisation still interacts with external oversight
bodies (principals) responsible for seeing that its activities are
implemented in accordance with the relevant organisational guidelines or
framework.
Further, the extent that the basic idea of reference or proposed model
is in conformity with the characteristics ofthe service is assumed to affect
the interactions. The conformity would influence the innovative process
as a stimulus or an obstacle. The more objective in measurement and the
less interdependent among activities, the faster and better agencification
would develop and work, because agencification operates in result-
oriented management through a performance agreement between the
chief executive and the minister or department.
In this regard, the interactive staging model improves the limitation
that policy process model is not really a causal theory (Sabatier, 1991).
Thus the model considers the influence factors in addition to the policy
process.
Background and Outlines ofAgencification: Initiation Stage
Agencification of execution functions first appeared in the campaign
pledge of the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), for the
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general election in 1996.The policy appeared to be modeled on the
Executive Agencies in the UK. After wining the election, the Hashimoto
Administration set up the Council for Public Sector Reforms, chaired by
the Prime Minister himself. At the sixth meeting in February 1997,
agencification was for the first time discussed as a means of downsising.
The Council then held hearings on agencification from all Ministries and
Agencies. There was hearing on national museums from the Ministry of
Education (MOE) in May 1997. At the hearing, MOE replied to the
Council as follows :
"Though four national museums at present operate independently,
financial support from the central government ensures the independent
operation. The pending problem for agencification lies in finance."
(Proceedings ofthe Council).
Further discussion promoting agencification followed the hearing.
According to the minutes of the subcommittee on planning, institution
and organisational issues in the Council, MOE already thought it possible
to transform the national museums into lACs. The MOE's reaction to
agencification at the stage was exceptional compared to other Ministries.
All Ministries other than MOE opposed agencification in the belief that
separation of execution functions would not only cause deterioration of
policy functions but would also be impractical. Of course their oppositions
surely reflected the bureaucratic preference to maximise budgets
(Niskanen, 1971) and the number of personnel. Therefore some people
might wonder at the MOE's reaction. This contrasted reaction however
can be understood by two factors according to the model.
First, in the case of national museums, the political power for
opposition to agencification was significantly weaker than other
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Ministries. National museums belong to the external organ of MOE, the
Agency for Cultural Affairs. The budget amount of the Agency occupies a
small part of MOE's total budget, just 1.4 per cent in 1998. In fact, there
are few politicians supporting cultural activities, in contrast to the
influential power of political groups (zoku) in other activities such as
public works and social welfare who, in cooperation with bureaucrats,
promote and support specific activities in return votes from the
beneficiaries for the activities.
Second, national museums were made a scapegoat for national
universities. In the process of discussion on agencification, national
universities were candidates for lACs. However, the budget for national
universities amounts to 26.5 per cent of MOE in 1998. In addition, the
staff is much larger than that of museums. The number of academic and
clerical staff is 124,784 in 1998 while the national museums' staff
amounted to 342. Besides, the former president of University of Tokyo,
Dr. Arima (now Minister of Education) joined the Council as a member.
By contrast to museums, he spoke for national universities.
Consequently, the Council did not reach a conclusion as to whether
national universities should be transformed into lACs. Final
determination on agencification was postponed until 2003.
In the public sector, since politicians as external actors have a
mandate of determining the organisational reform, the organisation has
little influence on the decision except for influencing external actors and
the principal. However, no external actors definitely opposed
agencification of national museums in the initiation stage. The primary
internal actor, MOE and its representative member rather promoted the
agencification. Receiving the final report of the Council, the Government
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decided that 89 institutions including the national museums should be
transformed into lACs. The Fundamental Law for Reorganisation of
Central Ministries and Agencies in 1998 describes the objectives and legal
status of lACs. The Basic Law for Independent Administrative
Corporations followed in July 1999. The latter provides the framework for
operating and controlling lACs.
Firstly, financial management in lACs operates on a modified accrual
basis through two types of fund: the grant for operating costs and the
capital expenditures from the central government. lACs have full
discretion to use the grant for operating activities. In addition, the grant
remaining unspent at year end may carryover to the following year.
Further lACs may retain the operating surplus under a certain condition.
On the other hand, full accrual accounting is adopted in financial
accounting; lACs prepare balance sheet, profit and loss statement, and
cash flow statement that are audited by external auditors.
Secondly, personnel management significantly differs from the
central government. Although employees in lACs other than four
institutions remain civil servants, their wages are linked to their
performance. In other words, the performance related pay (PRP) system
will apply to all employees in lACs. The chief executive does not enjoy the
life-long status but term status in a kind of contractual form between the
Minister in charge.
Thirdly, performance management will operate on the basis of
results. The chief executive sets the middle-range strategic plan covering
three to five years which contains the period, targets of efficiency and
quality of service, financial forecasts and so forth. The plan has to be
approved by the Minister after assessment by the evaluating committee.
-73-
440
At the end of the period, the performance must be reviewed by the
evaluation committee in accordance with the plan. The committee may
recommend the abolition or privatisation of the organisation to the
Minister based on the evaluation.
3. Response to Agencification
From initiation to designing
The detailed operating rules are left in the individual lAC law that
will follow the Basic Law for lACs. In practice the Basic Law just provides
the principles. For example, it provides that the Minister in charge shall
set the accounting rule on accrual basis. Accordingly, agencification of
national museums is now at the design stage. By contrast to the initiation
stage, through the MOE or directly, the national museums are able to
work and consult with external actors such as senior bureaucrats in the
Head Office for Promoting Public Sector Reforms and the Ministry of
Finance. The current operating system in national museums has several
practical shortcomings. They have felt the necessity to reform the system.
Limitations ofCurrent System
According to the ordinance, the national museums are defined as
cultural organisations, not research organs. As a result, it does not allow
the museums to receive scholarships or research funds from the outside.
Owing to the fiscal stress in the central government, the budget for
research activities is basically fixed in contrast to the national
universities where scientific research grants received have increased the
amount by 2.4 times in this decade. Consequently, the national museums
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deal with a donation proposal for research in an indirect way, bypassing
direct donations. The donor first purchases the collection(s) which the
national museum identifies, then donates it (them) to the museum.
However, this complicated method can not contribute to increase research
funds, because the budget for collections saved by this donation is not
allowed to be transferred to research activities under the current system.
The national museums are also operated in the General Account
Budget while the national universities operate in the Special Account
Budget where more flexible management is allowed. In national
universities, the operating surplus in the end of fiscal year might be
reserved as a fund (Article 12 of the Special Account Law for National
Schools). Therefore the museums sometimes lose the opportunity to
acquire appropriate collections because they have no funds other than the
approved budget for collections.
The national museums also have no mandate to assist other
museums. Most Japanese museums lack professional staff with special
management and collection skills, while recently many local governments
built museums and purchased the printings by famous artists such as
Van Gogh in the bubble economy. In order to deal with these constraints,
staff in the national museums have to take a leave to go or be sent to
other museums.
Expectancy and Fear
Accordingly, professional staff and managers in the national
museums do not always resist agencification. Since the Government
decided that national museums will be transformed into the Specific
Independent Administrative Corporations (SIACs) whose employees are
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civil servants, they have mixed feelings about agencification: expectancy
and fear.
First, newly established SIACs will be able directly to receive
research grants or funds outside the central government budget. SIACs
may also retain the grant funds remaining unspent at the year end.
Therefore, they expect that transformation might increase the amount for
research and facilitate acquisition for collections. On the other hand, they
fear that payment received from the central government would be cut,
accompanied by cost reduction measures or generating revenues from
other external sources and commercial activities. It is partly caused by
the obscure description in finance of the Basic Law for Independent
Administrative Corporations as follows:
"The government may grant a part or whole of necessary fund for
operating activities to the Independent Administrative Corporations
within the budget" (Article 46).
Second, SIACs will have significant discretion in allocating their
resources among functions or activities in accordance with the middle-
range plan. Although more flexibility in management is welcomed by
staff, in return they have to set the performance targets in the plan and
measure the results. After this, the performance shall be examined by the
evaluation committee. Though, as mentioned earlier, museum activities
are interrelated and complementary to each other, public interest might
be concentrated in specific activities: exhibition and education. A
manager in the national museum has said that:
"Exhibition and education are more visible to the public and easier
for measurement of performance than collection and research activities.
Accordingly, we fear that the former activities are given priority to the
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Figure 4. Employees by function in British Museum
Function 1998 1997
Care, research and authorship 446 456
Conservation 90 95
Exhibition 156 164
Education 32 30
Visitor Services 184 180
Fund raising and publicity 18 19
Merchandising 92 94
Management and administration ofthe Museum 120 119
1,138 1,157
Source: British Museum Account 1997-98, HC 1092.
latter in evaluating the performance. Surely research activity is central to
understanding of collections and supports other activities."
Third, staff in the SIACs will be able to give instruction or advice to
other museums if these functions will be defined in the specific law. On
the other hand, managers indicate difficulty in introducing PRP. The
national museums are organised by field or item than organised in
accordance with main functions, while the British Museum is to some
extent organised by function or activity (see Figure 4). For example, in
case of exhibition, an exhibition is usually implemented in a team that
consists of staff in related fields and general departments. In addition,
many projects including exhibitions spread over three to five years. This
causes difficulty in evaluating the chief executive of the lAC, whose term
will basically correspond to the period of the middle-range plan. The
actual exhibition would not be attributed to the current chief executive,
because some exhibitions in the middle-range plan might be planned and
prepared in the term of the previous chief executive, and reflected in the
current term.
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4. Discussions
At present, operating rules are under discussion and consideration
among the Head Office of Promoting Public Sector Reforms, MOE and the
national museums. Even though the individual lAC's law for museums is
enacted, details of operation and management could not be defined;
management matters are left to the individual organisations because of
their semi-autonomous character. Accordingly, it is valuable to discuss
and investigate the management issues presented prior to
implementation.
Financial Management System
First, under the proposed policy, capital expenditures will be granted
from the Minister in charge through the government bonds. This may
limit the autonomy in providing services because management of fixed
assets (capital) depends upon the will or fiscal condition of the central
government. In fact, an assistant director of the museum indicated:
"We could not implement an exhibition for two years, since the
budget for large improvements to the building was too small to complete
the improvement in a year."
In addition, while all fixed assets other than land are depreciated and
operating costs are measured on accrual basis in the financial statements,
the amount for depreciation is not granted every year. It basically leads to
a negative operating surplus in the profit and loss statement because of
the fixed assets having no grants from the governments, even though
grants for acquisition of fixed assets are credited to deferred capital
grants and expenditure accounts over the useful economic life of the
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assets. Hence, the financial statement might be misleading. Of course, the
government seeks to achieve its public spending objective by planning and
controlling the public borrowing through issuing bonds. In this controlling
perspective, it makes sense that the central government has funding
discretion on capital expenditures for lACs. Thus there is a trade-off
between ensuring autonomy and controlling in management of lACs.
Further, measurement problems have appeared in establishing lACs.
According to the proposed policy, fixed assets should be capitalised and be
included in the opening balance sheet at current cost. While it is not easy
to value buildings and facilities at current cost because corporate
accounting in Japan employs a historical based principle, valuation of art
collections in museums is by far difficult. Though all collections including
donations are booked at acquisition or estimated cost in compliance with
the Commodity Administrative Law, it is inappropriate that the current
cost is measured at price indexed or replacement cost.
In order to cope with the measurement problem, national museums
have proposed the practice that all collections remain owned by the
government and rented at no charge. In this case, the collections
purchased would be donated to the government and then trusted to the
organisation (museum). This resolution may escape the valuation
problem. However, the organisation which does not own its primary
operating assets is not only unnatural but also somewhat contrary to the
intended objective of ensuring autonomy in management, i. e. it could be
viewed that the organisation just acts in behalf of the central government,
not independently. Accordingly, so far there is no solution for harmonising
autonomy and operational flexibility.
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Performance Management System
Performance measurement and evaluation are less developed in
museums. There are no agreed or established standards for evaluating
performance, though performance or project evaluation in the public
sector has recently been mandated by the regulation of the Fundamental
Law of Reorganisation of Central Ministries and Agencies in 1998.
However, as indicated earlier, the Basic Law of lACs asks them to set
targets for efficiency in operation, quality of services, and improvement of
financial management. Accordingly lACs have to develop their
performance management systems. The adoption of accrual-based
accounting could help them to evaluate the results in efficiency and
financial management, since accrual-based accounting could produce
more reliable cost data and comprehensive view of fiscal conditions than
cash-based accounting.
Therefore the remaining issue is how to measure and evaluate the
quality of combined service. Exhibition and education seem to be
measured by the number of visitors for exhibitions and lectures
respectively. But many high quality exhibitions and lectures do not
always attract a high volume of visitors. On the other hand, the qualities
of collection and research activities are hard to evaluate objectively. This
does not mean that museum activities are unable to be evaluated in
quantitative terms, but just that the quantitative measurements may be
only a part of the overall evaluation. A director of national museum stated
that:
"Owing to the integrated nature ofcollection, exhibition, research and
education activities in addition to non-commercial character inherent in
art, measurement and evaluation of the performance is very difficult.
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Consequently we would like to employ a qualitative measure to evaluate
the museum's performance, especially professional judgement on
activities. In this regard, we hope that the professionals in art and the
persons having experiences in museums will join the evaluating
committee."
The above belief2) unfortunately does not bring forth a counter-
argument against the mandatory requirement for evaluation. Firstly,
peer evaluation is a closed control system within professionals;
professional accountability is just a necessary condition for public
accountability. Secondly, professional judgements are not always
consistent(3). Thus there exists a tradeoff between performance evaluation
and gov~rnanceor accountability.
t....rganisational and Personnel Management Systems
By contrast to large-scale museums like British Museum, the
national museums are operated with limited resources. This character
naturally leads to the organisational structure in which staff or employees
basically have responsibility for multiple functions (see Table 1 and
Figure 5). Many researchers implement exhibition, preservation and
education activities other than research and authorship. It makes it
difficult to operate the individual performance related pay (PRP); the
performance by function is the integrated result of many staff efforts and
(2) This belief is also found in the Scotland's National Museums and Galleries in the UK.
See National Audit Office (1995).
(3) For example, though five art commentators respectively were asked to select the five
best exhibitions in 1998 in the Asahi Newspaper (2 December, 1998), the exhibitions
which were selected from more than two commentators were just five among twenty
five exhibitions chosen.
-81-
448
Table 1. Comparison between Tokyo National Museum and British Museum
Item Tokyo National Museum British Museum
Establishment 1872 1753
Budget $ 47,444,000 $ 117,777,000
(Staff costs) ($9,264,000) ($43,670,000)
Staff 136 1,138
Visitors 0,873 million 3 million
Legal status department of MOE non-departmental public body
Sources: Tokyo National Museum (1998), Annual Report 1997-98; British Museum
(1998), British Museum Account 1997-98, HC 1092,
Figure 5, Organisation Structure ofTokyo National Museum
{
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· aCI lty IVlSlOn
President-Vice
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{
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and Sciences . Archaeological division
· Eastern Art division
· Preserve and restoration division
Department of
Data and Materials
it is impossible to compare the staffs individual performance among the
same function. In practice, when an employee has multi-task, it could be
argued that the incentive for the task whose performance is difficult to
measure should be weaker than other tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1991).
Moreover, since the fund for PRP in museums shall be financed
through the efficiency savings or increased visitor fees, this might conflict
with improving the quality of services. Accordingly, performance-based
organisational and personnel management has a risk of demotivating
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employees and deteriorating performance.
5. Conclusions
We have investigated the changing process in which the national
museums are being transformed into the Independent Administrative
Corporations (lACs), adopting the transition model developed. As a result,
it was shown that the characteristics in which the performance is difficult
to measure objectively and the activities are much interdependent have
produced some conflicts as the obstacle factor in the innovative process,
especially in the design and implementation stages. Although the decision
making for transition to lACs, i. e. agencification, was done outside the
museums, external and internal actors have interacted at the design
stage. The museum staff have mixed feelings about agencification:
expectancy in increasing autonomy on one side and fear in decreasing
financial assistance on the other side.
The complicated belief among staff has not yet turned to clear
understanding or acceptance of agencification. Instead three conflicting
issues have appeared at this stage. First, there is a conflict between
financial control by the central government and financial autonomy from
the government in granting funds for capital expenditures. Second,
performance evaluation by peer reviews might not be compatible with
public accountability through democratic control, because of the closed
system and inconsistency of evaluation. Third, performance-based
organisational and personnel management such as PRP does not
necessarily lead to improved performance. Although aims of museums are
to collect, preserve, exhibit, research and educate, it is unable to perfectly
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measure any activities in quantitative terms.
The above problems are common to other countries where public
sector reforms have been developed in accordance with NPM, while it
should be noteworthy that agencification for national museums in Japan
was created to prevent privatisation or agencification of national
universities. NPM has some deficiencies, as many commentators (Hood,
1991; Lynn, 1998; Frederickson and Johnston, 1999) have noted. In
particular, its customer-oriented principle could weaken the social capital
(Putnam, 1993). Despite the limitations, we can not ignore the idea that
public services are provided for members of the public as customers.
Museums funded by public money have to inspire and excite visitors to
the fullest extent through integrated activities. It is therefore necessary to
harmonise strengthening public accountability and autonomy, developing
the performance management system for museums whose character is a
combined public service by professionals in art. Also we have to refine the
interactive staging model by applying to agencification in other services.
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AGENCIFICATION OF NATIONAL MUSEUMS
IN JAPAN
Kiyoshi Yamamoto
The new public management (NPM) has spread around the world.
Agencification, which is a separation of government into policy and
execution functions, is not exceptional. While the process of organisation
change differs among countries and services, many studies for innovation
in the public sector have considered the transition collectively, i. e. a
change from traditional administration to public management. This paper
develops a new interactive staging model for organisational transition.
The model divides the public services into four types in terms of
interdependency and measurement objectivity of the composed activities,
and also it considers interactions between internal and external actors of
the organisation in the initiation, design and implementation stages. The
new model is applied to agencification of the national museums in Japan,
which is the transformation of cultural organisations providing a service
composed of multiple activities.
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